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CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1951-1970

OBGI-13

December 1972

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THE DDI HISTORICAL SERIES

OBGI-13

CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1951-1970

by

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(b)(6)

December 1972

(b)(6)

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Director
Basic and Geographic Intelligence

HISTORICAL STAFF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE, 1951-1970

I. Introduction

Current intelligence is a primary concern of
the CIA and has been of great interest to the
White House ever since the central intelligence
concept was adopted in 1946. A number of differ-
ent publications and a variety of other means have
been used to convey current information, with maps
and graphics playing an increasingly important
role over the years. The Cartography Division
(CD) has been associated with current intelligence
publications since 1951, and in a particularly
intimate way since 1965, designing and producing
thousands of maps and graphics to illustrate the
spatial aspects of current events.

This monograph traces the Cartography
Division's participation in current intelligence
activities. It will show how the need for the use
of ever more all-source materials, for greater
speed in production, and for greater simplicity in

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format became a pervasive force which required
ever increasing sophistication on the part of map
producers and consumers alike. Running parallel
to this will be the story of how several quasi-
independent and often competing graphics groups
associated with current intelligence in one way or
another were slowly but surely brought together by
1970 in the interest of administrative efficiency.

By and large, CIA's top management has
always encouraged high-quality graphics products,
and in the Cartography Division it has had a team
of motivated professional cartographers accustomed
to be in the lead in their field. In 1951, a very
small group of cartographers was separated from
the main unit, then called the Cartography Branch,
to service the special requirements of offices
within the Special Center. There, for over 19
years, it grew in importance and responsibility as
the Agency placed increasingly greater emphasis on
current intelligence production. To many people
within the Center, the small unit was the only
visible portion of the entire Cartography Division,

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though the job it was doing would have been impossible without the technical and research support of the larger unit. First as the Cartographic Support Section, then as the Special Support Branch (GC/X), and later as the All-Source Branch (CD/X) -- all usually known simply as "X Branch" or "Graphics" -- the unit turned out tens of thousands of specialized maps and graphics for a wide variety of requesters.

There was also a group of artist-illustrators within the Center, housed in the Office of Current Intelligence, which had existed under a similar wide variety of organizational names, sometimes in one unit, sometimes as separate units. The identity of these units was often confused with the All-Source Branch by casual observers. The responsibilities and methods of operating of the two groups were quite dissimilar, however, and the story of their relationships with each other prior to their merger into one unit in 1965 is an essential part of this monograph. After the merger, a symbiotic effect occurred

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between the two professions -- artists and cartog-
raphers -- that enabled the All-Source Branch
(called CD/X after the merger) to achieve
considerable acclaim in the production of high-
quality specialty maps and graphics.

Throughout the period, the search for better
methods of communicating vital information with an
accent on brevity spurred an increased reliance
upon graphics to tell essential parts of the story.
Significant advances in cartographic technology,
international crises requiring particular kinds of
graphic products, and the strongly stated personal
preferences of highly placed individuals -- in-
cluding Presidents and Directors -- caused profound
changes in the way things were done. No senior
official was more influential in this respect than
Mr. Richard Helms, both as Deputy Director and as
Director of Central Intelligence. His pointed
comments and continuing interest in effective
graphics led to the development of several unique
publications for the use of the President containing

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information of the most vital nature and relying extensively on maps and graphics to portray it.

At the beginning of the period, in 1951, the noun "graphic" -- meaning a picture, map, or diagram used as an illustration -- did not even appear in dictionaries. At the conclusion of the period, in 1970, graphics were an integral part of every major Agency publication, contributing in a major way to fulfilling the DCI's responsibility to inform the government on the significance of events taking place around the world.

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II. Where Things Stood in 1951 .

A. The Earliest Current Intelligence Publications

President Truman's penchant for conciseness
caused him to rebel at the mass of material
crossing his desk dealing with intelligence in one
way or another. In January 1946 he called upon
Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central
Intelligence in the newly created Central
Intelligence Group, to have prepared for him a
daily selection of items coming into Washington
from all sources which would serve as a summary of
the really important matters he should be aware
of. 1/* The advent of the first such selection on
15 February 1946 put Central Intelligence squarely
into the business of producing current intelligence
reports for high-level consumers. Even so,
Secretary of State Byrnes immediately protested
that the daily Intelligence Summary was an invasion
of his prerogatives. The President held firm, and

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*For serially numbered source references see Appendix.

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the National Intelligence Authority later made the preparation of such a summary mandatory. 2/

A small Central Reports Staff in the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) produced the President's <u>Intelligence Summary</u>, with support from all other parts of the Office. In December 1949 another group -- ORE's General Division, set up for the specific purpose of handling COMINT material -- also began to produce a current intelligence publication. Following General Walter Bedell Smith's reorganization of the Agency when he became DCI in late 1950, two separate groups continued to prepare two separate dailies -- one a COMINT-only edition and one a collateral-only edition. This arrangement satisfied no one, and on 15 January 1951 the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) was set up to produce current intelligence based upon facts and figures marshaled from all sources. Headed by Mr. Kingman Douglass, it consolidated the two predecessor groups.

In late 1951, Mr. Douglass described the activities of his Office as follows:

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1. Prepares a daily, high-level bulletin for the President and a half-dozen other officials.

2. Responsible for daily briefing of the President and the DCI.

3. Maintains a Situation Room in which maps and charts of key areas and important developments in many fields affecting national security are kept up to date.

4. Publishes a Daily Digest for general use; two weekly summaries dealing with developments of current importance; and periodic intelligence memoranda collating the most recent information on vital situations. 3/

The Current Intelligence Bulletin (the "CIB") got off to an auspicious start in 1951. The first edition was flown to President Truman who was vacationing in Florida. He immediately wrote DCI Smith, "You have hit the jackpot with this, Bedell." 4/ By 1952 the publication was going to the highest levels of government, but though maps frequently would have been useful, the severe time restraints posed an almost insuperable barrier to getting them in.

The first maps appeared in both the daily Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) and the weekly Current Intelligence Review (CIR) in August 1951.

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The first CIB map did not appear until the publi-
cation had been underway for almost six months,
then a map of ⬚ (b)(3) NatSecAct
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⬚ was run in the 5 August 1951 edition
(see Figure 1). The first CIR map, ⬚, was (b)(3) NatSecAct
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included in the third issue, 15 August 1951. These
maps -- rather crude by cartographic standards -- (b)(3) NatSecAct
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were made possible by the switchover in printing
from ditto to multilith, an offset process, when
ORE's Intelligence Summary was supplanted by the
CIB. Responsibility for producing this type of
map fell to the artists attached to the Situation
Room Division of OCI.

B. Cartographic and Graphics Units

Rigid security precautions surrounded the
activities of OCI, and as a practical matter it was
not possible to make effective use of the sub-
stantial body of cartographic expertise in the
Geography Division of ORR. The same security
precautions led to the need for providing several
"in-house" graphics facilities and were largely

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responsible for the unorthodox division of labor that characterized cartographic support to current intelligence for many years (see Figure 2).

The Cartographic Branch of ORR's Geography Division was unique in government in the manner in which it employed professional geographers to produce special-subject maps. Its know-how emanated from experience gained over almost 10 years of working together as a team, first in the Office of Strategic Services, then in the Department of State, and after 29 December 1947 in CIA. It, too, had been part of ORE but had become a part of the Geography Division of ORR as a result of a recommendation to that effect in the Dulles Com- mittee report. However, it had always been physically separated from the mainstream of Agency activity and was perhaps in that era temperamen- tally and spiritually unprepared to cope with the special time constraints imposed by current intelligence.

OCI, on the other hand, had a group of [   ]   (b)(3) CIAAct

artist-illustrators ("[   ]'s Shop") in the   (b)(3) CIAAct
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Technical Branch of its Situation Room Division.
This group formerly had been one-half of a larger
unit which had operated under various names since
CIG days, always working closely with the Director
and his staff on briefing aids, and it was the
only graphics shop in the Agency cleared to handle
COMINT material. Its charter assigned it specific
responsibility to

> present in graphic form the all-source
> intelligence available in all fields in
> support of substantive intelligence meetings
> [and] provide all graphics work for permanent
> Situation Room displays, as well as maps and
> charts for all OCI publications. 5/

For these reasons, it was the unit which produced
the first CIB and CIR maps, even though its roster
contained no cartographers.

The other half of the divided graphics unit
was also composed of ____ artist-illustrators.   (b)(3) CIAAct

This group, known colloquially as "____ 's   (b)(3) CIAAct
                                                       (b)(6)
Shop", had functioned as the Graphics Branch of
ORE for a short while after the split occurred.
The dissolution of ORE left this little unit with-
out a home in the managerial area that was to
become the Directorate of Intelligence. It was at

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first slated to become a part of ORR's Publication Staff, but ORR management decreed that a more logical place for it would be the Cartographic Branch. Steps were being taken in early 1951 to move it there. 6/

The Special Center, therefore, lacked any readily available cartographic expertise, even though OCI, the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), and the Strategic Division (D/Z) of ORR were all located there by 1951. Mr. _____, a GS-11 cartographer with OSS experience, was tasked by the Chief of the Geography Division to set up a production unit in the Special Center in "Q" Building and perform such liaison functions and advisory services within the Center as he was able. It perhaps was not a coincidence that the request for a special intelligence clearance for Mr. _____ was initiated on the exact date (2 August 1951) OCI published the first <u>Current Intelligence Review</u>, presaging the stress on maps that was going to come about a few years later. By October Mr. _____ had been joined by _____

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other assignees from the Cartography Branch, [   ] . The

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unit was soon formalized as the Cartographic

Support Section of the Cartography Branch. Some

knowledge of the parent branch is necessary to

understand the nature of subsequent events.

The Cartography Branch was comprised of

about [   ] people, including "compilers" (professional   (b)(3) CIAAct

geographers trained in cartographic research) and

"draftsmen" (cartographic technicians who turned

the manuscript into a form suitable for printing).

The Branch was self-contained in many respects. It

had been housed since 1950 in a small temporary

building (Building 11) several hundred yards east

of Tempo "Q" near Constitution Avenue and 23rd

Street, N.W. The building had been renovated to

meet Cartographic Branch requirements, and in

recognition of the drastic manner in which heat

and humidity changed sizes and shapes of drawing

materials, it was at the time one of the few

government buildings to be completely air-

conditioned from a central system. The Branch had

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its own file room, its own printshop for making
type and symbols, and its own laboratory for
research into the technical aspects of making
better maps. It also conducted its own training
course for new employees and in large measure
conducted its own recruitment program. Organi-
zationally, the Branch consisted of six sections:
three compilation sections, a drafting section,
and the recently acquired Graphics Section in
addition to the Cartographic Support Section.
Relationships among the sections varied. The three
compilation sections and the drafting section
worked closely together. The Cartographic Support
Section interacted regularly with both compilation
and drafting because of its liaison function and
because of the lingering associations between its
members and their former colleagues in those
sections. The interaction among these five units
was of extreme importance in the unfolding of
organizational movements which took place during
the next two decades because a high degree of
stability within the organization was retained,

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thus enhancing its ability to cope with changing
conditions in other parts of the Agency.

The Cartographic Support Section spent the
first few months of its existence establishing a
presence in the Special Center (the codeword area
of "Q" Building and other buildings as it expanded).
Acquiring the first items of furniture was a
matter of "scrounging." The unit operated as a
team from the very beginning, with each person
carrying on regular duties but pitching in in times
of crisis to do whatever he was equipped to do.
Many formal procedures followed in the parent
branch proved to be unnecessary in the smaller
unit, and the easy informality which arose there
became a valued tradition.

At that time the Strategic Division (D/Z)
was the only ORR component within the Center. It
was for them that the first map produced by the
new section was done: (b)(3) NatSecAct

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All the data added, including all   (b)(3) NatSecAct
type, was hand done. The second map was also an

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overprint to a base. The third map produced was
in fact the first map requested. 8/   It was
prepared for an economic study [   ]
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[   ]
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[   ] It, too, was an
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overprint to an existing base. The black plate
was out of register by 1/10" and the green plate
by 1/20". The type was prepared by an ingenious
("perditious," according to [   ]) device
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called an imprinter which employed letters placed
into a roller and rolled across the face of the
map to imprint the words in the correct location.

These maps were remarkable achievements
considering the conditions under which they were
done, but their crudeness was unacceptable to the
cartographer. It was soon decided to overcome the
security problem by scrambling type orders and
having the type prepared in Building 11. Printing
quality was another matter, however, because
facilities within the Center were very limited.
The small printing plant in Tempo "Q" was inde-
pendent of the main printing facility in South

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Building. It was originally set up to service the General Division of ORE and had made a paper transfer to the Office of National Estimates (ONE) for a short time before ending up in OCI. It would not be made a part of the Printing and Reproduction Division until late 1952. The [   ] staff operating the multilith equipment did the black text and red classifications simultaneously. 9/ They had also learned to overprint small base maps procured in quantity from the Geographic Division with story overlay plates prepared on multilith masters by an artist or cartographer using a pencil. Maps too large or too complex for this technique were carried to the main plant and printed overnight by specially cleared personnel. 10/ These are only a few examples of the many improvisations, made one after the other, that make up the story of graphics activities throughout the early years in the Special Center. They were essential because stringent security precautions put established facilities and procedures out of reach.

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III. Shakedown, 1952-1953

A. Map Production

The Cartographic Support Section provided their first CIB map 11/ on 18 January 1952, using an overprinting technique. It was to make this CIB item more meaningful:

Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR:

The Soviet Government has enlarged the restricted travel area for foreign diplomats to include key localities in the vicinity of Moscow as well as twenty-two cities in European Russia and Siberia. This action has the effect of further limiting foreign knowledge of defensive installations surrounding Moscow. Five of the cities are located on the Trans-Siberian railroad west of Lake Baikal. With these additions to previous restrictions, all possibility of observing this main artery for the supply of war materials and industrial goods to the Far East and the Korean front is eliminated. (See map on following page.)

The overprinting method proved satisfactory, and a series of several dozen unclassified bases was put into production in Building 11 to be available for use in the CIB. These were generally known as "   maps", after their sponsor, Mr.   of the OCI Situation Room Division.

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The CIB of 21 February 1952 contained the first

production model of this series, depicting _____ (b)(1)

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_____ (see Figure 3). The (b)(1)

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overlay was prepared in the OCI Technical Branch

using a typewriter for names and a compass to

draw circles. The technique continued to be used

for the next two years until the printing plant

acquired the equipment to print maps from scratch.

The weekly CIR began to contain both maps and

graphics in every issue by early 1953, produced by

both OCI's Technical Branch and Cartography

Division's Special Support Branch.

An examination of Agency publications before

this period reveals surprisingly few instances of

maps being used to depict current intelligence

situations, even in the case of Korea. This is in

such stark contrast to the period some years later

when _____ maps a day on Vietnam alone (b)(3) NatSecAct

were commonplace that it gives cause to seek the

reasons. Technical restraints were undoubtedly an

important factor, but there existed means to over-

come that hurdle if a strong enough demand had

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arisen. It seems in retrospect that the disjointed character and jumbled administrative control of the Agency's graphic and cartographic production resources would have hampered any efforts that might have been put forth.

B. <u>The Special Support Branch (GC/X)</u>

ORR was reorganized in July 1952, and the name of the Cartography Branch was changed to Cartography Division. The Cartographic Support ~~Construction~~ Section became the Special Support Branch (GC/X). It was initially headed by Mr. _____, who left "X" to return to Building

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11 as Chief of the Europe-Africa Branch in November 1952. Miss _____ took his place.

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GC/X worked very closely with OCI during most of the summer helping to plot intelligence information on large wall maps in the Situation Room. In the monthly report for August 1952 Mr. _____, the Cartography Division Chief, reported that "the Special Support Branch is well organized and can accept requests with confidence."

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In October it did ☐ maps for a Presidential
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handbook under a short deadline. In November
the entire Division did a series of maps, co-
ordinated by OCI, for the use of President-elect
Eisenhower. ·

C. Lack of Administrative Unity

The lack of administrative unity in graphic
matters was readily apparent within the Special
Center. GC/X of ORR provided cartographic support
to OCI; it also provided maps and graphics to OSI
and ☐ of ORR. The Technical Branch of
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OCI prepared maps and graphics for publications,
maintained the Situation Room displays, and pro-
vided visual aids for the DCI and other high-level
Agency officials. 12/ There was a clear (or
rather, unclear) area of overlap between the two
units.

Outside the Special Center, the Cartography
Division was not only fulfilling its unique
responsibility to produce maps requiring carto-
graphic research but also had under its wing a
Graphic Branch which in many respects overlapped

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and even competed with OCI's Technical Branch.
This unit ("⬜⬜⬜'s Shop," see section B of
Chapter II, above) had been grafted onto the old
Cartographic Branch as the Graphics Section in
February 1951. It is essential to understand the
shotgun-marriage nature of this union in order to
understand two subsequent mergers in 1954 and
1965. A substantially accurate account of it was
compiled for an earlier history.

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> For some time in the Agency there was a
> group called the Graphics Branch which had
> been shifted from one office to another
> ....Because they worked for the Agency as a
> whole and they did not fit in logically with
> any special group, no one wanted to join
> with them just for administrative purposes.
> Periodically, the Geographic Division had
> been approached regarding possible placement
> of the Graphics Section within its organi-
> zation. However, they always expressed
> unwillingness to such a transfer because a
> 'large part of the Graphics Section's work
> was neither cartographic nor geographic in
> character.' In a memo to Millikan, AD/RR,
> on January 18, 1951, the Advisor for
> Management apparently suggested, possibly
> as a final resort, that they should put the
> group in the Publications Branch, ORR. (The
> Advisor for Management wanted the group in
> ORR, but the main discussion was where, in
> ORR.) Before this change could be effected,
> the D/G finally yielded because 'it has
> become increasingly evident however, that
> certain advantages to CIA would accrue from

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a transfer of this section to the Cartography Branch, D/G...also understood that your Staff is desirous of recommending such action.' Furthermore, it was to be agreed that D/G would have the same 'substantive control over graphics and art work performed for all requesters that it now has over cartographic production'.' Thereupon, the AD/RR suggested to the Advisor for Management that the group be transferred to the Cartography Branch rather than to the Publications Branch as stated in the previous memo. The reasons given were that the work of the Section is 'basically dissimilar' to the Publications Branch, and direction should rest on a branch with similar functions. 13/

On 27 February 1951 the Geographic Division officially "took in" the Graphics Branch administratively. This could not be called a proper "merger," because although there was now one unit where formerly there had been two, each continued to do its own work.

The lack of a coordinated effort between ORR's Graphics Section (nee Graphics Branch) and OCI's Technical Branch, both performing the same kind of work, troubled the Chief of the Cartography Branch, Mr. _____ , who mentioned

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in the Branch's monthly report 14/ the need for a solution to the "total graphics picture" and for several months running stressed the need for a

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survey of the graphics facilities in the Agency.
Such a survey took place in late 1952. Covering
10 separate graphics facilities in the Agency, the
survey report noted that "The Deputy Director
(Intelligence) has requested additional graphics
within OCI publications that exceed [OCI's] capa-
bilities." It went on to recommend consolidation
of the units which lent themselves to it under the
"ORR Cartography Division of the Agency," since
it was believed that the "Graphics Branch of ORR
more closely approximates that of a central serv-
ice than any other facility." 15/ Management did
not accept this recommendation, apparently leaning
more toward the findings of a similar survey in
1950 which concluded that "centralization of
graphic facilities would in no way assist offices
affected," although "one building housing all CIA
activities would lend itself to [such] consolidation."
It would be another year before serious attempts
toward resolving the "graphics problem" would
begin anew.

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IV. The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1960

A. Graphics for the New President

President Eisenhower had been made acquainted
with the CIA during the 1952 election campaign.
President Truman had ordered that both candidates
be given periodic briefings, and the Cartography
Division had prepared some of the base maps that
were used by OCI Technical Branch in making the
presentation material.

With the change in administration, a
grandiose scheme was undertaken at OCI's request
to prepare for the White House a series of maps
of the regions of the world on hand-painted
panels, using enamel paint, which would be
instantly available for briefing purposes. 16/
The project required a maximum coordinated effort
from both OCI Technical Branch and ORR Cartography
Division which sadly turned out to be largely
wasted because the White House decided the maps
were too cumbersome to be usable. Abortive
efforts of this kind subsequently proved to be

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common with every changeover in administrations, but they illustrate the intense desire on the part of Agency people to provide a new president with useful information. Uncertainty reigns at the early stages of an administration about both the substance of the needed intelligence and the form it should take.

Eisenhower was known to prefer oral briefings over having to read reports. Both DCI Smith and DCI Dulles made frequent trips to the White House for these oral briefings, carrying large briefing panels made by either the OCI Technical Branch or the Graphics Branch in the Cartography Division. The President had additional contact with the Agency through both the CIB and the National Security Council. 17/ Presidential assistant Sherman Adams related

> Ready for him (the President) when he arrived [in his office each morning] were the latest State Department, CIA and military intelligence reports and the staff secretary, at first General Carroll and later General Goodpaster, would be on hand to give him the essentials in all the various intelligence information [see Figure 4]. Once a week the White House staff was briefed by the CIA and at the

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weekly National Security Council meetings
the President listened to another summary
of top-secret world developments by Allen
Dulles, the CIA head. 18/

A quickening interest in maps and graphics
was quite evident during Eisenhower's administration.
The considerable concern over the Nationalist China-
Communist China problem caused large numbers of
maps to be prepared on the Taiwan Straits and the
offshore islands. Berlin and the Middle East area
underwent recurring crises. It appeared to members
of "X" Branch that a conspiracy was afoot to keep
at least one hotspot going all the time, to which
they had to respond with overtime.

B. Jurisdictional Disputes and OCI Graphics

It became increasingly evident in 1954 that (b)(3) CIAAct
the OCI Technical Branch headed by Mr. _____ (b)(6)
_____ and the Cartography Division Graphic Branch (b)(3) CIAAct
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headed by Mr. _____ were engaged in un-
healthy competition. Moreover, the Graphic Branch (b)(3) CIAAct
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never did fit in very well with the rest of the
Cartography Division, which it had joined by
default. The artists and the cartographers got

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along very well socially and as individuals, but
it was clearly evident to everyone that they
marched to different drumbeats professionally.
Finally, in August 1954, the Chief of the Carto-
graphy Division met on several occasions with
members of the DDI's Office and the Situation Room
Division of OCI, 19/ and by November an agreement
had been reached for the transfer of the Graphic
Branch to OCI. Mr. [   ] expressed high praise
for the departing unit and its chief and commended
their contributions to the support of the Division.
He noted that the Branch had shown marked improve-
ment over the past several years, and he believed
that it would contribute greatly toward the
creation of an effective DDI graphics unit.

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The official notice of the change was issued
on 4 January 1955. It read as follows:

> 1. The Technical Branch, OCI and Graphics
> Branch, ORR, have been consolidated into the
> Graphics Branch, Presentations Division,
> with offices in Room [   ]

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> 2. The mission of the new branch includes
> analysis and production of graphics for all
> the DDI offices, but excludes cartography,
> which will continue in ORR.

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3. Mr. [   ] has been designated
Chief of the new Graphics Branch. 20/

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The new Graphics Branch came immediately to
be known as "OCI Graphics." Soon after its
official establishment, which was more than two
months after the fact, a new version of the
Current Intelligence Weekly Review went into
production. In a foreword to his new publication,
Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon, Assistant Director for
Current Intelligence, described it as being

> the first number of a new weekly Code Word
> publication of the Office of Current Intel-
> ligence which replaces the Current Intelli-
> gence Review, the Situation Summary and
> Critical Situations. 21/

It was to consist of four parts: a summary; "Of
Immediate Interest"; "Notes and Comments," dealing
with less urgent situations; and an analysis of
long-term trends.

Graphics and maps were going to be
increasingly important for the new Weekly, but new
jurisdictional disputes between Cartography
Division and OCI Graphics were in the making. In
the third issue of the new Weekly, [   ] maps and a
chart appeared, all prepared by OCI Graphics.

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Professional sensibilities in the Cartography Division were pricked by what they regarded as poor map work. The matter was discussed at the Branch level and thought to be resolved several months later when Miss [   ] reported that

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> when we take over map work for the Weekly we will handle all liaison with editors and staff of the Weekly instead of going through O/CI Graphics. 22/

A shock was in store, because the "take over" of Weekly map production was not to be an accomplished fact for some time to come. In two separate notices, OCI addressed the issue without clarifying the hazy areas of responsibility. For example, on 13 June 1955 OCI announced:

> Effective this date, the Chief, Presentations Division, in carrying out his responsibilities for the production of illustrations (graphic and cartographic) for O/CI publications, may call on either Graphics Branch, Presentations Division, O/CI, or the Special Support Branch, Cartography Division, O/RR, as appropriate. 23/

The jurisdictional confusion still existed in August. [   ] wrote that "the lack of clear-cut directives is the primary cause of the problem." 24/ A second OCI notice in September

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concerned the overall problem but failed to address

the issue that was of interest to the principals.

  1. Purpose These standing procedures
are issued to prevent publication of in-
adequately conceived and executed graphics
in illustration of articles published by O/CI
in its Current Intelligence Weekly Review
(CIWR) and Current Intelligence Weekly
Summary (CIWS).

  2. Scope This regulation applies to
O/CI. A copy has been transmitted to AD's
of other offices contributing illustrated
articles to the CIWR and CIWS, with request
for their issue of similar instructions
within their offices.

  3. Responsibility° [Describes respon-
sibility of author-analyst for correctness
of data and for making sure the graphic is
in accord with the concept originally
approved by the O/CI Publications Board.]

  4. Procedure [Describes the channels
for requesting a graphic and includes a
sample request form.] 25/

The first step in the procedure described in

paragraph 4 of the regulation required the analyst

to obtain the approval of the Chief of the

Presentations Division of OCI for his graphic.

The Presentations Division therefore retained

de facto authority to segment responsibilities as

the Chief saw fit. By December Mr. [   ] was

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able to write in the monthly report that

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A meeting with the Chief of the Presentations Division resulted in a clearer understanding of relationship between Graphics Branch and GC/X. 26 /

In a lengthy memo entitled "O/RR Cartographic Division Views on Responsibility for Artwork in CIWR," describing the same meeting, the Chief of the Presentations Division presented the OCI view as well. Essentially, he said that Mr. [   ] was bringing up his concern over a breach in the understanding that OCI Graphics' field of endeavor did not include doing maps or "statistical charts," which lay within the purview of Cartographic Division. .

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> Mr. [   ] has received the impression that the consolidated D/Pres Graphics Branch would, in essence, confine its future work to the production of large-size illustrations required by various DDI components. All other artwork was envisioned as the proper responsibility of O/RR's Cartographic Division (and Miss [   ]'s Special Branch in particular). 27/

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He went on to say that the pressures of deadlines made it mandatory for short-deadline work to be done in OCI Graphics, whether maps or non-maps, and that efforts being made to achieve greater

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leadtimes were not particularly fruitful. He

criticized a recent illustration planned and

executed by the ' _____ group".

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> The conception was excellent, but an
> otherwise impressive treatment was reduced
> in its impact by a 'style' that remained
> fussily cartographic, rather than bold and
> simple.... 28/

He concluded,

> there is no question but that Mr. _____
> feels most strongly that the Agency's
> interests will best be served if most
> conventional CIWR maps are for the most part
> produced by his Division.... 29/

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He stated that, as a matter of policy, OCI would

give Miss _____ "first refusal" on all con-

ventional maps for the CIWR, OCI appeared

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determined to avoid relinquishing any of its

prerogatives.

In April Mr. _____ reported optimistically

that during the past six weeks GC/X had contrib-

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uted essentially all maps required for the OCI

Weekly. He viewed this as an encouraging

development which reflected cooperative efforts of

the Branch and OCI. 30/ However, an examination

of the Weeklies during that period reveals that

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the matter was not in fact resolved for several more months. During May, [ ] maps in the Weekly were made by OCI and [ ] by GC/X. In June, [ ] (b)(3) NatSecAct were made by OCI and [ ] by GC/X. By July all cartographic work was being done in GC/X, and a jurisdictional problem that had been in ascendancy for almost two years was finally resolved.

C. Technical Advances

In the early Eisenhower years, the number of maps and graphics used in the CIB and the Weekly grew, but printing plant limitations made these efforts appear crude. Color work was possible, though considerable jury rigging was necessary to get it.

A significant forward step took place in February 1954 when the printing plant acquired a Robertson studio camera which made photo-offset printing possible in the Special Center for the first time. The first use made of it for a CIB map was to illustrate the order of battle in [ ] and the adjacent area of [ ]. (b)(1)
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Terrain hachures showed in green, place names and

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boundaries (from the plates to a Cartography
Division map) in black, 17 order-of-battle symbols
for enemy forces in red, and three symbols for

[   ] garrisons at [   ], and

[   ] in blue. 31/ It was the forerunner

to many [   ] similar maps produced on   (b)(3) NatSecAct

[   ] over the next 17 years in a constant

attempt to portray the "situation." The map was
a new departure not only in printing technique but
also in that it was cut into the text adjacent to
the section of the story it illustrated and was a
valuable adjunct.

As soon as the functional separation between
OCI and GC/X became effective, there was a
spectacular upturn in the quality of the graphics
and maps in the Weekly. Under the new arrange-
ment, artists and cartographers -- members of two
different professions -- exclusively did work they
were trained to do, and they collectively became
a part of the team that provided the Weekly
readership with a high-quality publication indeed.
The Weekly was quite voluminous, averaging [   ] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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pages of text in the beginning and more than [   ] (b)(3) NatSecAct

later on. Map and graphic work was becoming quite

sophisticated (see Figure 5). By the third year

of publication, OCI Graphics was averaging [   ]

charts and GC/X [   ] maps in each issue. The high   (b)(3) NatSecAct

quality of this publication reflected the work

of the OCI Publications Board and its Secretariat

who oversaw the Weekly (and the CIB) down to the

smallest detail. Mr. [   ], a staff member   (b)(3) CIAAct
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who coordinated the work of the analysts with the

expertise of the artists and cartographers, was a

strong force behind this achievement. 32/

For reasons that are not clear, the juris-

dictional problem that arose with respect to the

Weekly did not spill over to the CIB. OCI Graphics

had exclusive responsibility there and ran a "late

shift", originally with approximately one-half of

the work force but later as a [   ] operation,   (b)(3) CIAAct

which had as one of its purposes the preparation

of graphics for the CIB. Few charts were required,

but a map or two appeared in almost every issue.

GC/X base plates drawn for a previous Weekly map

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were invariably used by the OCI Graphics late-
shift person who prepared the overlay depicting
the particular event that was being reported (see
Figure 6). The artists who worked the late shift
made no claim to being cartographers and in fact
would have considered being called one a
disparagement. Their training placed a premium on
the quality of visual impact. This led to an
occasional cartographic howler, such as the time
a Mercator projection was used to plot the impact
points of four Soviet missiles shot into the
Pacific, landing within a few tens of miles of
each other but on both sides of the meridian that
bounded the base map. The CIB appeared with an
illustration showing two spots on the left-hand
side of a world map and two on the right-hand side,
separated by almost 25,000 miles.

The Current Intelligence Bulletin was re-
placed by the Central Intelligence Bulletin on 14
January 1958. It differed from the former CIB
principally in that it was fully coordinated
within the community. 33/ Taking into account

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President Eisenhower's liking for both maps and
brevity, the inside front page of the new CIB
contained a map of the two hemispheres with areas
highlighted where significant events were taking
place, along with one or two short sentences
providing a brief. The front-page map (see Figure
4) proved to be a successful device and was
continued unchanged until President Kennedy set
forth his own distinctly personal requirements.

The story of "X" Branch would be incomplete
without a passing reference to the role it played
in utilizing U-2 photography from the earliest
days. Quite apart from its work on OCI publications,
the Branch undertook the task of using the photo-
graphs to construct maps of Soviet cities about
which there was an almost total lack of first-
hand knowledge since prewar days. It was the
first known attempt to use this new source to
construct large-scale maps. Efforts continued
until the Army Map Service in 1959-60 applied its
vast resources to meeting the requirement for up-
to-date maps of the Soviet Union based on aerial
photography.

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V. The Kennedy and Early Johnson Administrations, 1961-1965

A. The New Frontier

President Kennedy's voracious appetite for information was not satisfied by the one-page briefs that had been done for President Eisenhower. OCI immediately added to its string a new daily publication specifically tailored to President Kennedy's needs. It was called the "Checklist" and was literally all-source, containing items such as agent's reports and information derived from clandestine photography. 34/ The "Checklist" (later called the President's Daily Brief) contained an occasional map or chart lifted from the CIB, but only rarely was an original map done for it.

The "New Frontier" also brought into the White House offices a number of young intellectuals who concerned themselves with foreign affairs. In the early part of the Kennedy administration, weekly National Security Council briefings by Mr. Allen W. Dulles, DCI, were still carried on. According to the usual routine, OCI Graphics

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prepared visual aids for these, and one of the
younger artists was detailed to escort the boards
down to the White House in a station wagon, set
them up in the cabinet room, and stand by outside
until the meeting was over so that he could take
them back to Headquarters. During the transition
period in early 1961, Mr. Dulles walked into an
NSC meeting a few minutes early and saw Mr.

of OCI Graphics standing beside the
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briefing boards. He presumed he was another one
of the youthful representatives of the New
Frontier come to learn the state of the world. He
put out his hand and boomed, "Dulles, CIA." Mr.

replied, "Yes, sir, I know. I work for you." (b)(3) CIAAct
                                              (b)(6)

B. Move to Headquarters Building

Almost coincidental with the beginning of
the Kennedy administration was the Agency's move
to its new building. GC/X moved concurrently
with OCI in the fall of 1961, occupying Room   (b)(3) CIAAct
in the Special Center. These were ordinary
quarters, but they were equipped with a number of
accouterments which improved efficiency. There

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were special light fixtures for added illumination, a photolab for in-house duplication of master plates, and a spacious vault for storage.

Several new materials and pieces of equipment had been uncovered by the Division's Technical and Construction Branch which enabled GC/X to become largely self-sufficient in the preparation of type and certain intermediate materials required in a cartographic production shop. 35/ It was becoming more and more a miniature version of the entire Cartography Division, operating autonomously in many respects.

OCI Graphics was very kindly treated with rooms on the ⬚ floor having an array of floor-to-ceiling windows looking across the Virginia woods into Maryland. It was also conveniently located between the OCI editorial offices and the printing plant which was provided with excellent facilities. It could handle every need of both the artists and the cartographers. Just prior to the move, Mr. ⬚ once again took over the direction of GC/X. Miss ⬚

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had resigned from the Agency in 1960, and Mr.
[   ] had acted as Branch Chief during
the period, June 1960-August 1961.

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C. The Crisis, USSR/Cuba

GC/X was closely involved in providing
intelligence support during the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962. U-2 photography flown on Sunday,
14 October, showed surface-to-surface missile
sites under construction southwest of Havana.
During the day on Monday, an urgent request came
into "X" Branch from OCI to make a map showing
distances from the sites to the United States. A
manuscript map was hastily prepared and handed
over. At the same time, in another part of the
Division, a query had come in from ORR asking for
the exact distance between pairs of coordinates
in Cuba and Washington, D.C. The range of the
missiles and the distances of the sites from
Washington and other major cities were of most
intense interest during the first few hours after
detection. Some analysts learned for the first

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time that determining distances along earth arcs
is a great deal more complicated than measuring
short distances on a school map. Fortunately,
several individuals in the Division were trained
to cope with this kind of problem, and accurate
determinations were quickly made. Washington lay
at the outer edge of estimated range capabilities
of the type of missile first detected.

On Tuesday, 16 October, Mr. [   ]
[   ] made a map from scratch which showed distance
relationships between the missile sites and the
United States. 36/ It accompanied a three-page
typescript OCI memo, 37/ believed to be the first
authoritative information disseminated on the
probable Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba, though pre-
liminary judgments had gone to the Secretary of
State late Monday night 38/ and 'to the President
at 9:00 a.m. on the 16th. 39/

During the following ten days, GC/X was
fully occupied with Cuba. Almost half the projects
officially logged in between 16 and 26 October
dealt with it in one way or another, and considerable

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unlogged support was provided to the Situation
Room and to "walk-ins" who needed immediate
cartographic support. The 16 October map had to
be extended three days later when longer range
missiles were detected. After President Kennedy
invoked a quarantine on foreign shipping on 22
October, emphasis shifted from the sites themselves
to the Soviet ships steaming toward the island.

The formal daily situation report called
"The Crisis, USSR/Cuba," prepared for the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council begin-
ning on 24 October, contained surprisingly few
maps. 40/ Only two basic maps were used: one was
a CIB-type map of the island and the missile
complexes done by OCI Graphics; the other was a
reiterative map of the North Atlantic showing the
progress of Soviet ships as they moved toward the
Caribbean. 41/ One of the ironies of the time was
the printing on 18 October for the SECRET-level
Current Intelligence Weekly Summary of a Cuba map

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Branch activity returned to the normal
routine after the lifting of the quarantine on 27
October. The final brush with the Cuban crisis
occurred a month later. A fairly sophisticated
map, twice as large as page-size, was done
to accompany a memo for President Kennedy laying
out in detail the time sequence of construction
activity. 42/ In an attached note addressed to
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Cline,
the DD/I, noted that it was to be used for "Mr.
Mikoyan's visit to the President tomorrow" (28
November). 43/

The Cuban missile crisis illustrated, among
other things, the frequently demonstrated fact
that being "in the know" about important current
events gives people in the current intelligence
end of things a tremendous psychological boost,
even though the demands upon their personal lives
are arduous at times. The Cuban crisis was kept
under the tightest security wraps for the first
seven days. The President's 22 October speech,

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bringing the matter into the open, provided a
great measure of relief to persons privy to the
Soviet activities. The Secretary of State said
afterward in a television interview that

> Senior Officers did their own typing; some
> of my own basic papers were done in my own
> handwriting in order to limit the possi-
> bility of further spread of the utterly
> vital matters we were dealing with. 44/

D. New Tasks for Cartographic Support

During the early 1950's, a high proportion
of GC/X efforts had been devoted to doing maps and
graphics for basic ORR and OSI studies of special
classifications. The association with OSI was so
close in the mid-1950's that some consideration
was given to setting up a support unit in Barton
Hall when OSI moved there from Tempo "M". 45/ ORR
requirements had increased considerably after [   ](b)(3) CIAAct
Division was dissolved in 1953 and the entire
Office was housed in the Special Center. The
support required for OSI zoomed in 1962 following
Mr. Albert D. Wheelon's assumption of the post of
Assistant Director, and it rose for the entire
DDS&T Directorate when he became the Deputy

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Director for Science and Technology in August 1963.
Mr. Wheelon relied extensively on graphics for his
own presentations and liked to see them in DDS&T
publications (see Figure 7). He created a small
graphics shop as part of his own staff (and
incidentally recruited [ ] of Cartography Division's   (b)(3) CIAAct
most promising young cartographers to man it).
The total graphics load was so great, however,
that the workload in GC/X became heavily balanced
on the side of non-current intelligence. It was
necessary for Branch strength to be increased
gradually from [ ] persons in 1961 to [ ]   (b)(3) CIAAct
persons in 1965 to cope with the overall workload.

By early 1964, Vietnam had become such a
preoccupation of the White House that several
specialized publications were created to deal with
the subject. GC/X provided an occasional map for
the "Weekly Report of the Intelligence and
Reporting Subcommittee of the Interagency Vietnam
Coordinating Committee," issued by the Agency
beginning 28 February 1964. Distribution was
tightly controlled in the beginning, copies going

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only to Mr. McGeorge Bundy and other members of
the Committee. The maps in it were not particu-
larly revealing, being used principally to
locate "critical provinces" for the reader and to
pinpoint military activity. A year later, on 9
February 1965, a daily Vietnam Situation Report
came into being, with wider -- though still
restricted -- distribution. The new daily was
begun in connection with renewed US air strikes
against North Vietnam. It contained only an
occasional map during its first several months,
and those were prepared by OCI Graphics over GC/X
base plates. Later on, a locator map became
routine, and every issue contained two maps: the
so-called "Boundary Map" (named for its original
title, "Administrative Boundaries") and the
"Strike Map" showing air activity. Both maps were
completely lacking in merit (see Figure 8) as
examples of either graphics or cartography but
were continued unchanged for several months, even
after the responsibility for preparing them was
taken on by the cartographers after the 1965

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merger (see below). Their production was regarded as a necessary evil by all concerned, and they were given as short shrift as human nature could devise.

E. Consolidation

The Geographic Research Area of ORR was consolidated with the old Office of Basic Intelligence on 1 July 1965 to form a new Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI). The chain of command in the new Office was:

Director: James A. Brammell
Deputy Director:
Executive Director:
Chief, Cartography Division:
Deputy Chief, Cartography Division
Chief, All-Source Branch:
Deputy Chief, All-Source Branch:

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A series of personnel shifts were made, including the assumption of the duties of Chief of the All-Source Branch by Mr. Current intelligence was a new milieu for Mr. whose previous assignment was Chief of the Branch in the Cartography Division.

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Even as the new Office was being formed, steps were underway to merge OCI Graphics and the All-Source Branch (now called "CD/X") of Cartography Division. Mr. Paul A. Borel, the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, had undertaken intensive studies of the organization and operation of a number of DDI components on behalf of Mr. Ray S. Cline, the DD/I, and several major managerial changes resulted from these studies.

Mr. Borel's perusal of Agency publications convinced him that text and graphics needed to be integrated more closely and that the work being done by the two graphics organizations was so similar in character as to make a merger mandatory. 46/ After personally conducting a survey in early July 1965, he summarized his findings on the first point as follows:

> 2. As I see it, the DDI has, through its publications and informal memoranda, repeatedly demonstrated high competence to communicate through the written word. We have also shown considerable ability to communicate through the graphic arts (photography, cartography, artistic illustrations and renderings). We have done less well in imaginatively relating text and graphics in

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combinations wherein each supports the other
with optimal results. The problem therefore
is to explore what steps may be taken to
upgrade our present effort.

   3. Improvement in the use of graphics
can, it seems to me, come about in a number
of ways.

   a. The amount of graphics can be varied
       to advantage, some being used, for
       example, where none has been. This
       is most likely to be the case where
       graphics are used to supplement text.

   b. The quality of graphics now used can
       be improved to make for a more mean-
       ingful presentation; that is, to tell
       its story more quickly or more
       accurately.

   c. More importantly, there no doubt are
       ways of using graphics or graphic
       techniques as a superior way of
       communicating ideas now conveyed
       verbally. This would involve graphics
       as a substitute for text. 47/

   Mr. Borel further indicated that there were

administrative and organizational problems ranging

from

       aspects of personnel management, competition
       for limited resources, allocation of
       priorities in view of appetites for service
       beyond means to satisfy, technical problems
       in the use of color vs. completion of
       projects with short deadlines, and the host
       of other matters involving the selection
       among options each having different impact
       upon PSD/DDS. 48/

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As a next step, Mr. Borel proposed to visit each graphics shop to familiarize himself with its program and problems and to discuss with its leaders their ideas on how best to proceed.

It was in fact true that, so far as DDI publications were concerned, no discernible difference existed in the kinds of requirements being placed upon the two graphics units. Nevertheless, OCI's two mainline publications presented a particularly muddled situation. Since 1956 it had been established practice that for the Weekly, maps were done in GC/X and non-map graphics in OCI Graphics. For the CIB, both maps and non-maps were done in OCI. The increasingly frequent maps in the CIB were often comprised of a mixture òf a Cartography Division base map and an overlay made in OCI Graphics. CIB's for July 1965 contained two basic maps of North and South Vietnam, [   ] [   ] and a scattering of [   ] other base maps used [   ] times each. To an observer such as Mr. Borel, the evidence as to who was doing what graphics in the various DDI and DDS&T

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publications was difficult to discover, and the division of responsibility appeared quite illogical. For example, GC/X did maps for the OCI Weekly and OCI Memos, but not for the CIB. OCI Graphics did illustrations for the Weekly and for OCI Memos, but not for the rest of the DDI or the DDS&T. Cartography Division, GC/X in particular, did all DDS&T work, both maps and non-maps. A not un-common spectacle at the time was a cartographer, holding a Master's Degree in geography without any formal training in design, laboring over a set of simple drawings for a DDS&T publication while an illustrator, holding a degree in art and skilled in design and layout, was doing a patchwork job on a map for the CIB.

On 19 July Mr. James A. Brammell, the Director of Basic Intelligence, submitted a formal proposal that the Graphic Division, OCI, be trans-ferred to the Cartographic Division, OBI, and assigned to GC/X Branch. His supporting argument ran as follows:

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2. The problem of providing the DDI with a coordinated graphic-support facility can best be served by centralizing the function under a single management. Essentially, all graphic support (maps, charts, graphs, briefing aids, etc.) involves the visual medium. Experts in cartography, in graphic arts, and in visual aids all employ the same basic skills and techniques. Coupled with professional training in geography, a combined unit can provide an 'across-the-board' total graphic support facility.

3. The effectiveness of the All-Source Branch, CD/BI, results from the strong administrative support within the Division and the close support given that branch by the other branches in the Division. This includes the latest technical methods and the total research-compilation efforts of the regional branches. By consolidating the graphics unit in the All-Source Branch, these support facilities would be automatically available to the total effort.

4. Single management also would provide a single contact point for requesting graphic support. Greater efficiency would be possible in assigning specific tasks and priorities, arranging for reproduction, maintaining files, and reacting to 'crash' projects.

5. The effectiveness of graphics in supporting intelligence depends on the quality of trained personnel, the maintenance of skills, the effectiveness of solid management, the stimulation of imaginative products, and a 'team' concept with high morale. A merger would provide these in a minimum of time. 49/

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Mr. Brammell's suggestion was accepted, as was his target date of 1 September 1965. On that date, a terse DDI notice stated:

1. Effective 1 September 1965, the Graphics Division, OCI, is transferred to the Cartography Division, OBI, and integrated with the All-Source Branch.

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2. After that date, all requests formerly made to the Graphics Division, OCI, will be directed to the Chief, All-Source Branch, Cartography Division (Mr. _____),(b)(6) Room _____

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3. Requests for cartographic support not requiring special classification will continue to be directed to the Chief, Cartography Division (Mr. _____), Room _____

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The new unit, continuing under the formal name of All-Source Branch (CD/X), but more often still referred to as "X Branch", was comprised of _____ . _____ persons had cartographic backgrounds, and _____ came from OCI Graphics. The managerial problem was to get the two groups to pull together toward a common goal. To outsiders -- for example, the DDI management -- the products of "X" Branch and OCI Graphics showed sufficient similarity for them to be thought of as coming out of one professional group, but in fact

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the disparate backgrounds of the people in the two former units did not lend themselves to a perfect blending. Mr. Brammell admonished the new Branch Chief, Mr. ⬚, to avoid restructuring the Branch into sections and to guard against the two former units continuing as cliques, each going its own way. However, conditions made it mandatory that at least an informal breakdown be recognized to keep production going and standards high. ⬚ ⬚ teams made up of cartographers/illustrators were tried with limited success. There was constant disagreement between the senior people in the Branch, on the one hand, who knew team spirit was slowly developing, and Division and Office management, on the other, who harbored the old fears, over the need to organize the Branch along lines reflecting the type and volume of work coming in. This fundamental issue remained a matter of internal controversy for the next five years.

For six months CD/X operated out of both Rooms ⬚. Support to the current

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intelligence publications and work on briefing
materials was carried on in Room ⬚, and maps   (b)(3) CIAAct
and graphics for special projects, memoranda, and
reports were done in Room ⬚. Then the latter   (b)(3) CIAAct
quarters were expanded, and by early March 1966
consolidation was a fact. CD/X was housed in
Rooms ⬚ and ⬚ until it moved to the   (b)(3) CIAAct
⬚ floor in 1970.

F. DCI Raborn's Influence on Graphics

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., served
as Director of Central Intelligence from 28 April
1965 to 30 June 1966. With his liking for
flamboyant graphics, he had a considerable
personal impact on the Cartography Division.

Admiral Raborn's initiation into the office
coincided with the Dominican Crisis in April 1965,
when several thousand US Marines were sent into
Santo Domingo to give protection to American
nationals there during a period of violence and
disorder. CD/X produced a large quantity of maps
of the city and the sanitized corridor along which
Americans could move safely. These were provided

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to the Agency task force established to watch the situation and were used for situation reports, memos, and the CIB, most of which were delivered promptly to the new Director.

To acquaint himself with the worldwide situation, Admiral Raborn instituted a series of morning briefings covering a specific area or topic. These were held at 9:00 a.m. daily, as the first item of the Director's staff meeting, and were conducted by Agency area and topical specialists, usually analysts from OCI or ORR. The briefing schedule was set up well in advance to allow the analyst ample time to prepare himself thoroughly and to order supporting graphics. From [ ] to [ ] briefing boards became the order of the day, and the artists in CD/X were swamped with requests entailing considerable work of the kind they most liked to do. Numerous accolades from analysts and periodic compliments from the Director were passed back to CD/X personnel and were excellent morale builders for them.

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Admiral Raborn soon engaged the services of
Mr. [_____], an old associate of his in
the Polaris program, to give Agency supervisors a
lesson in the proper use of graphics in putting a
message across. On 13 August 1965 the auditorium
was filled to capacity with every Agency officer
of Branch Chief rank on upwards to hear Admiral
Raborn give a short talk on his experience with
effective graphics in the Polaris program and then
to introduce Mr. [____] who talked for more than
two hours, using a large quantity of illustrations
to make his points.

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The lesson took. Analysts who had previously
avoided the use of maps and charts began to under-
stand their importance in reaching pressed-for-
time policymakers. A measure of the change is
indicated by a comparison of the number of maps in
the CIB in July and in October 1965. In July, (b)(3) NatSecAct
before the lecture, [__] maps on [__] different areas
were used. In October, [__] maps were used, plus
several other graphics. This doubling of effort
was not limited to the CIB but carried across the

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board. The burgeoning production figures of the next 12 months (see Figure 9) stemmed from several causes, but Admiral Raborn's interest in maps and graphics was one of the principal ones. For example, Admiral Raborn wanted an atlas on [   ] in preparation for [   ] and paid a personal visit to the Division on a Saturday morning to discuss the project with Cartography Division personnel responsible for the production of reference-type maps.

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In CD/X, requests went up 28 percent, from [   ], in the first six months of the existence of the combined unit compared to the previous six months. To keep up with these requirements overtime became a way of life, [   ] hours being recorded between September 1965 and February 1966.

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Admiral Raborn again retained the services of Mr. [   ] in June 1966 to further the cause of effective communication through more use of graphics. Dr. Edward W. Proctor, the Acting DD/I, and Mr. [   ], Chief of Special Staff, OCI, were responsible for the arrangements. Following a

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morning session with Dr. Proctor and Mr. ⬚ ,
Mr. ⬚ met in the afternoon with ⬚

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supervisors of various map and graphics shops in
the DDI, DDS, and DDS&T. Good intentions not-
withstanding, it was not a profitable undertaking.
Mr. ⬚ described the problem as being "100

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percent human," incensing the cartographers and
artists. 51/ However, in his 11-page report to
the Assistant DD/I entitled "Expanding the Use-
fullness of CIA Graphics as Instruments of
Communication," he dealt himself out of cartog-
raphy calling it "a highly specialized function
in which I have no experience" and restricted his
remarks to "the charts and graphics and panels
used by both government and business in oral
presentation."

Dr. Proctor forwarded the report to the
Executive Director describing Mr. ⬚ as "the

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Director's Consultant" and noting that

> although it is supposed to present his
> recommendations based on his review of the
> Agency's activities, the memo outlines
> exactly what he told me before he had his
> discussion with the heads of CIA graphics
> shops and before he had a chance to review

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our publications. Clearly these are his preconceptions; yet, there are some worthwhile recommendations in the memo. This could be of use to whomever may be given the task of reviewing the organization and production of CIA graphics. 52/

There is no corroborating evidence to substantiate the hint that an overall review of Agency graphics facilities was in the offing. Admiral Raborn resigned as DCI on 30 June 1966, and the matter was dropped.

G. India-Pakistan War, 1965

Open conflict between India and Pakistan broke out in early September 1965 in the Jammu-Kashmir area, following a number of violations of the 1949 cease-fire line by both sides. A task force was set up to monitor the situation, with situation reports published several times a day in addition to the CIB item. Admiral Raborn's desire for good graphics was by now common knowledge, and the task force wanted to make full use of situation maps in its reports. The new Branch Chief of the new consolidated Branch immediately felt a kinship with Admiral Raborn's position

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during the Dominican Republic crisis five months
earlier when he faced both a brand new job and an
on-going international crisis of the first order.
An approach toward preparing current situation maps
that began to take shape during the few weeks of
the India-Pakistan war developed into a fine art
in later crises. It is necessary to go back a bit
to understand why.

An unrecorded but openly admitted reason
behind the merger of the two units was to achieve
better maps in the CIB. To the cartographers this
meant more accuracy and detail. To senior Agency
officials it meant greater clarity and less detail.
Criticisms at upper levels which may have been
voiced in constructive terms invariably filtered
down to the mapmakers as admonitions to remove the
"clutter," a term too subjective to justify
specific reactions. The cartographers felt that
everything they were in the habit of including on
the maps (locations of forces, roads, towns,
streams) was essential to understanding the story.
Still, criticisms about "too much clutter"
continued to be heard.

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The cartographers doing the India-Pakistan
maps (Miss [ ] and Mr. [ ]
[ ]) and the Branch Chief finally decided they
would prepare a map that would show the opposing
forces and little else. This effort appeared in
the <u>President's Daily Brief</u> of 17 September, and
it had far-reaching consequences. Quite by
accident, not only was the map devoid of the usual
supporting "basic information", omissions which
were planned, but the Printing Plant had neglected
to print even the terrain plate, which was supposed
to bind the data together visually. Mr. Helms,
then the Deputy Director, ordered the map completely
redone by the next morning. Mr. [ ] was told by
the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer that Mr. Helms
had said in no uncertain terms that the next time
he saw a map like that he was going to get someone
by the ****. [ ] people literally worked all
night to do a new map which was so successful it
was used almost daily for the remainder of the
crisis. This episode marked a turning point in
CIA current intelligence mapping. It laid the old

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shibboleth of "clutter" to rest, because the new
map had more information on it, not less, but the
background data were woven into the story better
than before. It also proved that senior management
was indeed anxious to have high-quality maps in
current intelligence publications, that off-the-
shelf items were not good enough, and that the
days of "short shrift" were past.

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VI. Growing Pains, 1966-1967

A. Searching for Simplicity

On 8 August 1966 the Chief of CD/X was
called into a meeting by Mr. E. Drexel Godfrey,
the Director of Current Intelligence, and found
himself surrounded by several senior OCI people
responsible for the CIB and the Vietnam situation
reports. His memo describing the event gives an
insight into the desire on the part of management
to get "good" graphics and into some of the
obstacles that were rapidly being put behind us.

> [1] Played twenty questions for an hour
> and 10 minutes with Drex Godfrey, Dick Lehman
> (Deputy Director, OCI), Waldo Dubberstein
> (_____, OCI), _____,
> _____ (panel secretary for the CIB).
> They are desperately anxious to improve CIB
> and SITREP (the daily Vietnam Situation
> Report) graphics. They are sympathetic to
> our real problems, but want to smooth out
> rough spots. Godfrey is going to direct CIB
> panel to ensure that adequate guidance will
> be given on graphic requirements, in place
> of the 'map' or 'chart' now thought sufficient.
>
> Godfrey wants _____ to function
> as a _____ staff, clearing path for correct
> procedures. I told Godfrey (he agreed) that
> we did not want ____ to be a bearer of messages.
> We must not cut off contact between cartographer
> and analyst.

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Dubberstein has strong personal opinions about appearances of graphics. I pointed out to the group that personal tastes varied considerably, and we had to play percentages. 53/

In effect, Godfrey was solving the problem posed by the "graphics coordinator," a paper position which had been created by Mr. R. Jack Smith, his predecessor as D/OCI, after the transfer of the OCI graphics shop to OBI. The "graphics coordinator" position proved to be untenable for the incumbent, Mr. ⬚, in that he had

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responsibility to oversee the use of graphics in OCI publications but with no authority to get things done. He was generally blamed for anything that went wrong, and it was clearly in the interests of everyone to make the analyst and the cartographer or artist more completely responsible for the accuracy and timeliness of the map or graphic. Moreover, the notion was rather widely held that the job had been created to assuage several members of OCI on the loss of their own graphics shop. Godfrey did not rescind the office notice defining the duties of the graphics coordinator, but by putting ⬚ into the

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picture in the place of a formal "coordinator,"
he was providing a means for the OCI front office
and CD/X to communicate instantly on problems.
This decision lowered some tensions that had
previously existed and hastened the day for
achieving more effective graphic products.

B. A Unique Cartographic Form

The cartographers in CD/X began working out
various systems of portraying military activity
against a cartographic background that would
enhance the reader's ability to see spatial re-
lationships. High-level interest in Vietnam was
evident from the criticisms -- and praises -- of
maps in the CIB or the Vietnam Situation Report
handed out by the DDI at the DCI's morning meeting.
The problem of achieving high-quality cartographic
backgrounds was solved in 1966 by beginning a series
of maps at varying scales designed for the express
purpose of being overprinted with current intelli-
gence information. The "all-purpose" base map
approach was cast aside.

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The most significant advance in handling the
portrayal of military operations was achieved by
an ingenious method of producing relatively large-
scale (larger than 1:1,000,000) area maps begun in
1966. Three dimensional plastic relief map blanks,
that is, without color overprint, were procured
from the Army Map Service. These were side-lit to
permit the shadows to enhance the terrain detail
and then photographed. The photographs were pieced
together, and the splices disguised with an air-
brush wielded by the Division terrain specialist,
Mr. [   ]. The transportation was
drawn at a very large scale and photographically
reduced by a factor of two to four times to obtain
the correct degree of fineness. "Clutter" was
handled by judicious selection of colors and
screens and judicious omission of the nonrelevant,
such as geographic coordinates and small streams.
These base maps were preprinted, omitting the
plates subject to change, such as the name plate,
and stocked in the [   ] floor printing plant
for instant use. They were highly successful and
became the envy of DIA mappers. They had just the

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right combination of simplicity, authoritativeness, and timeliness (see Figure 10). Miss [____] and Mr. [____], the developers of the map form, worked in close partnership with OCI area specialists and the printing plant to get new maps prepared on areas that appeared to be on the verge of becoming hot, so that a quite sophisticated map might appear in the CIB when the action took place.

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This technique was employed to maximum advantage during the North Vietnamese buildup in the vicinity of Khe Sanh in early 1968. There were indications that enemy forces were beginning to concentrate near the Allied base at Khe Sanh in early January. From then through the height of the assault in mid-March there was great concern for the safety of the troops there. To present information in the most meaningful fashion possible, CD/X prepared [____] base maps at graduated scales, each focusing upon progressively smaller areas. When enemy pressure reached its height, authoritative maps were available on which small details, such as trenching, could be shown.

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C. <u>A Cartographic Analysis of a Soviet Activity</u>

By virtue of its being the only all-source area in the Division, CD/X was called upon to perform many kinds of cartographic tasks not associated with current intelligence. Among these was a 1966-67 project sponsored by the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC), requiring cartographic portrayal of the activities of several _____ (the _____ (b)(1)

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series). Masses of information derived from ELINT were available _____

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However, so much data could not be assimilated by even the most sophisticated reader. It was decided to analyze all data available _____ _____ as a representative first look. It (b)(1)

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was next decided to plot onto existing base maps the territories _____

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projected manpower input to do this was so enormous

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that some means had to be found to reduce it. CD/X turned to the growing but then relatively inexperienced computer staff to seek a way to manipulate the data and turn it into something directly usable by the cartographer. The officers involved, Mr. _____, CD/X, Miss _____, FMSAC, Mr. _____ an IBM contract employee, and Mr. _____, DDS&T, tackled the problem with the gusto of new physicians in an epidemic.

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A symbiosis among the professions took place in this project that in many ways helped the entire Division -- perhaps the Agency -- get into the forefront of computer applications to carto- graphic problems. A list containing over _____ facilities of military significance around the world, stored on magnetic tape, was uncovered at the Pentagon. A selection of about _____ _____ was made from it and matched against the areas _____

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by a machine owned by the Office of Special
Activities. The names of the targets were sorted
by a meticulously planned arrangement and processed
through a third computer program -- developed by
Printing Services Division in connection with the
National Intelligence Survey -- which automati-
cally provided type placement on the final map.
Everything worked as planned, and the results (see
Figure 11) stimulated much favorable comment. The
Director wrote Mr. Brandwein, Director of FMSAC,
a note expressing his interest in the project, 54/
and a group of DDI planners opined later that here
was one instance where computers paid off.

D. The Search for Better Design

The pressure from all sides to improve the
clarity of Division products gave several Branch
Chiefs pause to reconsider training requirements.
Division personnel had always been their own
severest critics on technical matters and geographic
interpretations, but training in the area of design
was lacking. The opportunity for day-to-day
association with several excellent resident artists

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instruction plus considerable homework. The

results were impressive. Mr. [   ] touched a

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responsive chord in people who had hungered for

more knowledge about this neglected part of their

cartographic education. Their "homework,"

comprising exercises in the use of colors and

shapes, was put on display in the Headquarters

Building in an exhibition sponsored by the Fine

Arts Commission.

E. Miscellaneous Chores

"X" Branch carried on many service-type

activities that went unrecorded in the logbook.

It was a convenient place to go, it had a wide

variety of talents available, and it imposed little

bureaucratic redtape. Some of the jobs that fell

to it were:

> Designing nonroutine Agency covers for
> reports

> Doing DDP graphics work, if specially
> classified

> Providing reproducible materials to graphics
> shops in the Defense Intelligence Agency
> and other organizations

> Providing placecards for the DCI's dining
> room

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> Preparing type for titles to most DDI
> publications
>
> Serving as a source of supply for analysts
> who need materials to make their own
> briefing aids
>
> Preparing special briefing books for high-
> level officials on the eve of foreign
> visitors' trips. (Several done for
> Vice-President Agnew were very favorably
> received.)

Other commissions were somewhat less routine.
The Arab-Israeli War in June 1967 led to the
practice of making the Chief, CD/X, responsible
for providing the Director's Conference Room with
suitable maps during times of international crises.
Care was exercised in choosing what was to go
there, to make sure that it would be useful. The
Branch was familiar with the room, having
previously been asked by the Deputy Director,
Admiral Taylor, to "do something about the map
panels on the walls," for which it had then done
two handsome raised-relief maps of Africa and
Latin America. An easel was set up, and between
1967 and 1970 it usually contained a map of the
current crisis area -- such as Nigeria, Laos,
Saigon, or Czechoslovakia -- suitably annotated.

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In December 1967, a telephone call came into the Branch from President Johnson's social secretary, Mrs. Juanita Roberts. She asked that a map be prepared for use in a memento booklet of the President's recent globe-circling trip. With some imaginative planning, a handsome spread of two hemispheres was produced by means of the Division's automatic plotter and data bank. The map 55/ was appropriately entitled "All the Way with LBJ" and must have made a hit with the President, because the two project officers, Mr. [   ] and Mr. [   ], each received a copy of the map from him inscribed to them personally, perhaps the only instance of a president citing a CIA cartographer.

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The Branch was usually called upon to support Agency task forces providing a round-the-clock watch on an international crisis, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, or on a presidential trip abroad, such as President Johnson's attendance at the Punta del Este Conference. In the case of international crises,

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appropriate maps were obtained from the Map Library
and posted on the walls of the task force quarters
in the Operations Center. Task force members or a
CD/X representative annotated these with the latest
information. Task forces issued situation reports
throughout the day, and CD/X normally provided a
map for at least one of the reports, in addition
to the map going into the CIB. In the case of
presidential trips, most of the work involved
plotting the President's itinerary on the largest
possible scale map and identifying pertinent
facilities, such as hotels where the correspondents
were staying or the local police headquarters. On
some occasions, a second display was prepared for
DDP who maintained their own watch.

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VII. Case Studies, 1968-1970

A. The Production Machinery

Procedures for producing and communicating were basically stable for the entire life of "X" Branch. The trend was steadily in the direction of placing greater responsibility on Branch personnel and fostering increasingly closer contacts between the Branch and requesters.

Over the years the Branch had developed a filing system for originals and negatives and a cross index of published maps that permitted very quick turnaround time for spot requests. A map on almost any country or region in the world could be on the press within an hour. A new kind of type-writer produced by the International Business Machines Corporation called the "Selectric Composer" purchased in July 1968 proved to be invaluable for quick preparation of small type. Two Varitype Corporation "Headliners" were purchased for large type. [   ] place (b)(3) NatSecAct names were preprinted and kept on hand for instant

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application. Base map production by the rest of the Division was closely monitored and duplicate sets of plates obtained. These and similar efforts provided the Branch with unmatched resources to produce high-quality maps on short notice. The Branch clerk-typists, notably Miss [   ], were the overseers of these support activities.

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The printing plant on the [   ] floor, under Mr. [   ], was very responsive to all Branch requirements. Its photographer, Mr. [   ], and [   ] day-shift foremen, Mr. [   ], performed miracles with their limited printing equipment designed for 1961-type requirements but not for the quality taken for granted a few years later. All requests for service were channeled through Mr. [   ] [   ] in OCI. Requests that would have an unusual impact on the printing plant were cleared through Mr. [   ], Chief, Intelligence Information Staff, OCI.

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In early 1969, the "X" Branch was organized into three sections -- Map, Publications,

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and Presentations -- each responsive to a
particular kind of requirement. This formalized
an internal structure dating back a year or more.

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The Map Section, headed by Miss [   ] and
later by Mr [   ], was staffed with

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[   ] professional cartographers who
concentrated on map production and development.

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The Map Section Chief coordinated Branch efforts
toward the <u>Current Intelligence Weekly Review</u>,
including attending the planning meeting held every
Monday at 10:15 a.m. in the OCI Front Office. The
deadline for CIWR graphics into PSD was Thursday
noon, making Thursday morning a particularly busy
time in the Map Section. A member of the Section
remained on duty Thursday evenings to examine
copies of the graphics as they came off the press
to make sure everything was in order. In the
event of error, corrective action was taken on the
spot.

The Map Section also staffed the Branch
duty-officer roster, in recognition of the fact
that the frequent emergency calls invariably

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involved map work. The duty officer came in at
10:30 a.m. and worked until 7:00 p.m. or until his
work was done, Sunday through Thursday. He took
the following Friday off to compensate for the
Sunday. The Map Section was responsible for
evolving map products that addressed the needs of
the Weekly, the CIB, the several DDI offices, and
the peculiar requirements of the USIB Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).
Considerable pioneering effort went into employing
the Division's growing electronic data processing
expertise for these purposes (see Figure 12).
Each officer had an assigned geographic area of
responsibility, did most of the maps on his area,
and maintained contact with counterpart area
specialists in the Cartography Division to keep
his geographic base information current.

The Publications Section was responsible for
producing non-map graphics. It was staffed by
[   ] Visual-Information Specialists   (b)(3) CIAAct
(formerly Illustrators General). The Deputy Branch
Chief, Mr. [   ], served as Section Supervisor.   (b)(3) CIAAct
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He coordinated all DDS&T, OSR, and ONE graphics

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requirements. Each officer was assigned the graphics requirements of a particular office. As an aid to planning, Mr. [   ] periodically attended the meetings of the OSI Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director, Dr. Donald Chamberlain. The Office of Strategic Research (OSR) graphics requirements reflected an appreciation of the art of graphic communication held by its Director, Mr. Bruce Clarke, and the know-how of the Chief of its Publications Staff, Mr. [   ] [   ], a veteran of the CIWR. The Branch Chief attended the weekly OSR production meeting, chaired by the Director, Mr. Clarke.

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The Presentations Section was responsible for single-copy briefing aids. It was staffed by [   ] Visual-Information Specialists. Their work, and the work of their predecessors, is the subject of a separate OBGI historical monograph by the Section Chief, Mr. [   ] [   ]

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The total size of CD/X after 1965 varied between [   ] persons, including the Branch

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Chief, [   ] supervisors, [   ] clerks,   (b)(3) CIAAct

[   ] artists, and [   ] cartographers.   (b)(3) CIAAct

Also, one artist was permanently detailed to the   (b)(3) CIAAct

National Indications Center at the Pentagon.

Division management augmented the strength

of the Branch whenever the work overload reached

an intolerable level. Officers were detailed there

for periods of days or months to work on specific

tasks or just to help out. In general, an attempt

was made to rotate officers who had tired of the

pace and replace them with officers who had not

previously experienced the unique activities of

the Branch. Unfortunately, this policy applied

only to cartographers. There was no reservoir of

artists or illustrators outside the Branch.

B. The Three-layered CIB

When OCI overhauled the CIB in early 1968,

the graphics received close attention. The book

formats were revised to comprise three versions,

with one all-source version prepared specifically

for high-level officials who needed to get the

message clearly and quickly. This new CIB

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provided its readers with succinct, authoritative, and comprehensive summaries of all significant current developments.

Just prior to the launching of the new CIB, CD/X leadership had at last been provided with an instrument to wield on stubborn analysts unrelenting of their traditional prerogatives to control the map. It was in the form of a memo from Mr. [   ], Chief of the OCI Presentation Staff, directed to all components involved in producing the CIB. In his usual forceful style, Mr. [   ] wrote that

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> A careful study of fresh lacerations and older scar tissue indicates that the Director reacts negatively, to put it mildly, to CIB Graphics that are not self-contained and self-explanatory....Do not run a map which is a puzzle until you read the text. Unless the title of the map, or a specific legend, makes it clear why certain areas are colored, don't color them....In other words, the maps should contain what is necessary to help the reader understand the text, but inasmuch as he is going to see the map first don't create a map which interests and puzzles him so much that he bogs down before going on to the text matter. 56/

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As a snapper, the Chief of CD/X or his representative (Mr. [   ] or Mr. [   ])

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was now included in the daily CIB planning meeting

where initial decisions were taken with respect

to the thrust of articles and judgments made on

whether meanings would be clarified with the aid

of a map or other graphics. After a month of

experience with the new CIB, launched on 23 April

1968, Mr. [   ] was able to write in an internal

memo to CD/X personnel that

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> Recent comments to me by D/OCI, D/OBGI...
> and numerous requesters clearly indicate
> we are consistently producing interesting,
> useful and attractive products for the
> CIB. 57/ [See Figure 13]

C. The President's Quarterly Report

In late 1969 work commenced on a CIA project

which would pull together into one thin report

"evaluated facts with interpretive comments" on

the subject of Soviet strategic forces. 58/ It

was to be aimed at one consumer, the President of

the United States; to be produced quarterly; to

be all-source without limitation; and to impart

maximum information with minimum verbiage. OSR,

under the leadership of its Director, Mr. Bruce

Clarke, was the principal production agent, and

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representatives from OSR and CD/X worked together
to devise a concept and a layout which would achieve
the desired aims. It was agreed that tight self-
discipline would be exercised on space utilization,
and the graphics would be used freely to convey
ideas of magnitude and change. Opinion was
divided on format, so Mr. [ ] of CD/X
was tasked to establish a model. He proposed a
folio-size book, one page for each topic, using
maps, photos, sketches, and graphs in harmony with
paragraphs of text. He also presented an
alternative book more conventionally done up. To
everyone's delight, the DD/I, Mr. R. Jack Smith,
favored the folio approach and was seconded by
Mr. Helms and Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger.
After very considerable effort to remain within
the limitation established by the format, success
was achieved. Mr. Helms wrote Mr. Clarke a note
describing the report as "one of the best things
we have ever done." 59/ Its doing required an
enormous expenditure of planning time on the part
of the analysts, the artists, and the printers.

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It also represented another example of the fact
that sound planning was the sine qua non of
effective graphics communication.

D. Automated Mapping Applications

The variety of requirements placed upon CD/X
allowed it many opportunities to experiment with
automatic data processing applications to carto-
graphic problems. These experiments met with
varying degrees of success. Some solutions were
conversation pieces that afforded such design
niceties as bird's-eye views of the earth from
space. Some offered a better basic map projection
than was otherwise obtainable; the first successful
use of the Division data bank was of this nature. 60/
Some were spectacularly successful in terms of
man-hours saved or in superior quality achieved.
The latter points became increasingly significant
as COMIREX requirements grew more sophisticated.
Plotting of thousands of targets, earth traces,
range-rings, azimuths, etc., became routine
production problems, limited only by the accuracy
of base maps. Work done in the Branch, primarily

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by Miss[_____]and Mr.[_____]in late   (b)(3) CIAAct
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1969 and early 1970, demonstrated that an accurate

base 61/ coupled with various computer programs   (b)(3) CIAAct
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offered vastly improved capabilities to monitor

certain collection programs involving photography.

E. Vietnam Coverage

The war in Vietnam at first exhilarated, then

exhausted, eventually bored, and always disap-

pointed people closely associated with reporting

about it in CIA publications. CD/X, and OCI

Graphics before it, passed through each stage.

"New boys" were invariably given the job of doing

the routine daily maps. The periods of exhilaration

and creative endeavor were associated with breaks

in the routine. There were a number of these between

1965 and 1970, several of which have received prior

mention in this monograph. The intensity of

interest in Vietnam by the White House was

continually evident. CD/X prepared many[_____] (b)(3) NatSecAct

of maps and graphics on every phase of the war,

many for ultrasensitive reports. Secretaries of

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Defense McNamara and Clifford received profusely illustrated studies from the Agency on the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. The National Security Council staff wanted "Eyes Only" maps done of the trends in the pacification program. Studies on all phases of the war went to Presidential advisors Walt Rostow and Henry Kissinger. One of these projects is worth describing in some detail because it illustrates both the problem-oriented character of much of CD/X activity and Mr. Helms' views on the potential of a well-thought-out graphic.

In mid-November 1969 the DCI directed the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA) and the Chief, CD/X, to devise a single-page graphic that would illuminate trends in the war. It was to be for the President only and designed to be delivered to the White House within hours after the receipt of statistics. Several mockups were shown to the DCI who made pointed criticisms about each one, continually stressing the importance of simplicity and the necessity that trends be

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quickly evident. The final plan contained a
series of small graphs of quantifiable factors
comparing one year with another, combined with
short narrative comments. It was favorably
received at the White House. It has been updated
weekly since the first issue and is routinely
delivered to the White House the same day the
data are received by SAVA.

F. Reorganization and Consolidation, 1970

The increasing complexity of map requirements
at special classification levels developed to a
point that began to give OBGI management rather
grave concern about the effectiveness of the
organizational structure of the Cartography
Division. In 1969 the Division Chief proposed
that the Division be housed either entirely within
or at least contiguous to the Special Center and
that the branches be restructured to overcome
deficiencies that had become more pronounced over
the years. According to his plan, the entire
research activity, for example, should be central-
ized in one large branch; CD/X activities would be

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curtailed, and some of its functions spun off to the other branches. In a memorandum on the subject of a proposed reorganization of the Cartography Division, he described the problem thus:

> The All-Source Branch [CD/X] is isolated from the Division physically and extremely difficult to manage in all aspects. With an increase to ⬚ people it becomes a major chore to handle time and attendance reporting, supervise production, provide policy guidance and control, and provide for house-keeping chores, supplies and materials. It is quite obvious that the Branch responsibilities have expanded to the point it has become an entity relatively isolated from the other Branches of the Division. This has lead to management of the Branch making policy decisions which rightly belong in the province of the Division Chief. There is a duplication of production effort between the All-Source Branch and both the compilation branches and Technical Support Branch. Because of the policy of production based on classification there are frequently reports issued with graphics produced by both CD/X and the downstairs units which leads to confusion in the Division and in PSD. 62/

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Sufficient space to house the entire Division within the Center could not be obtained, and it was decided that appropriate support to current intelligence could be rendered from facilities located outside the Center. Accordingly, in November 1970, the old CD/X -- which had been renamed the Current Intelligence Branch (CD/I) in April 1970 -- moved

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into quarters on the [   ] floor contiguous with
the rest of the Division. A large portion of its
responsibilities, together with a third of its
personnel, went to other branches in the Division.
The entire Division was by then provided with
security safeguards that enabled work to be done
on projects bearing special classifications. The
move brought to a close an activity that was
established to fill a gap, had done its job, and
was wound down as an independent outpost after
producing [   ] individual pieces of work.

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VIII. Conclusion

The all-source current intelligence support
unit of the Cartography Division was created to
make cartographic support available to components
within the Agency's Special Center. It continued
to fill a need over the ensuing years, not only
in meeting cartographic requirements but also in
the rapidly developing field of graphic communication.
It worked in harmony with a wide variety of
requesters and associates, and it served well during
crises and during a period of expanding Agency
influence in the Intelligence Community.

A curious aspect of an assignment to one of
the units doing current intelligence support work
was that one either loved or despised it. A
neutral, take-it-or-leave-it attitude was rarely
encountered. There is no rational explanation in
academic managerial courses as to why it should be
so, but all those who have held the post of Branch
Chief in either the "X" Branch or the OCI Technical
Branch look back upon their tenure with warm

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satisfaction -- despite the fact that the job offered relatively poor physical working conditions, mental strain, external pressures, long hours, frequent weekend work, and no increase in pay.

Several impelling lessons have come to this writer out of his assignment as Chief of CD/X:

a. Recognition of an individual's contribution to his profession is one of the more important rewards he can receive.

b. Busy officials who have little time to read voluminous reports are very appreciative of a map or graphic that lets them see at a glance how the present compares with the past, whether the trend is toward more or toward less, or whether the outlook is favorable or unfavorable.

c. Maps and graphics done solely to "beautify" a report are usually a waste of time.

The Agency has provided the cartographers as a group with professional standing, career development opportunities, and physical facilities always adequate to the task. This investment in managerial support has been amply repaid in that

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the Agency has always been in the forefront in
matters involving thematic maps and mapping. A
past chief of the Cartography Division regards
the long and successful struggle to raise the
professional standards of the cartographers as
"our finest hour." This achievement stands in
vivid contrast to the professional standings of
the artists, cum illustrators, cum visual infor-
mation specialists in the Agency, who play a vital
part in getting the Agency's message across. A
question that senior management would do well to
consider is whether similar attention is being
paid to the human side of developing the art of
graphic communication.

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Appendix

Source References

The writer was closely involved with developments relating to the July 1965-June 1970 period, during his tenure as Chief of CD/X. Personal files, containing scribbled notes and memos of record, were valuable supplements to official documents in reconstructing the events of the period. The Records Center holds archival copies of all Cartography Division maps and graphic production (when multiple copies were made), filed numerically. OCI memoranda, both formal and typescript, are filed in the Records Center by date of issuance and frequently contain marginal notes concerning high-level reaction of interest to the historian. OCI's serial publications (the various weeklies and dailies) are filed by title and date.

Files held by the CIA Historical Staff were invaluable in determining the sequence of events that shaped the present DDI during the transitional period of the early 1950's.

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One of the problems in writing a microcosmic history is that many achievements, not to mention goofs and internal managerial crises, never become a matter of record. The writer has had the good fortune to be friends with most of the staff members in both graphics and cartography during the period which is the subject of this monograph and had heard over lunch much enlightening information that put the official record into perspective.

Monthly reports were a requirement in the Cartography Division from its establishment, and record copies have been retained. They are useful as leads to activities and problems but rarely provide sufficient background material to permit weighing the relative importance of achievements.

Anonymity was a passion with management of the era, making it extremely difficult to establish which personalities were involved in history-making projects. This is quite evident in monthly reports, where surnames were a rarity.

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A five- or six-digit number in the lower left-hand corner is the only identifying feature of graphics and maps produced by the units described in the monograph. "X" Branch numbers were:

OCI

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Graphics used a code that indicated the year, month, day, and item. For example, [ ] shows the item was the second job logged in on 3 April 1965. This numbering system was discontinued on 31 August 1965.

Individual source references are cited below.

Source References

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Figure 1. The first use of a map in the Current Intelligence Bulletin (5 August 1951).
Drawn by one of the artists in OCI, it appears to have been an experiment, since
no other maps appeared in the CIB for several months.

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Figure 2. Cartographic and graphic units in OCI and ORR, ORE and OBGI, 1946-1970. Cartographic support to current intelligence evolved along the lines indicated on the diagram. The Cartography Division provided a stable base which supported and ultimately absorbed other units engaged in current intelligence support.

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Figure 3. Example of a [____] map as used in the Current Intelligence Bulletin. (b)(3) CIAAct
base map prepared by the Cartography Division was overprinted on a multili(b)(6)
press, using a multilith plate made with a typewriter and pencil. It represented a
major step forward in cartographic style over the crude maps used in earlier
"Bulletins."   Approved for Release: 2018/02/27 C05875316

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28 FEBRUARY 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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
III. THE WEST

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
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Figure 4. Maps such as this appeared as frontispieces in the Central Intelligence
Bulletins in the last years of the Eisenhower administration. They provided the Presi-
dent with a synop

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
Figure 5. Maps in the Central Intelligence Review in the late 1950's reflected a high degree of correlation between text and map. Newly available printing inks provided cartographers with opportunities to experiment with design that ultimately evolved into a kind of cartographic journalism that became one of the hallmarks of CIA cartography.

CYPRUS

Figure 6. A map from the Central Intelligence Bulletin in early 1965. Such maps were pairings of base plates from the All-Source Branch and overlays made by the "late shift" officer in OCI Graphics. Quality was irregular, depending upon the availability of an appropriate base and the skill of the late shift officer.

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Figure 7. Example of a map made for a DDS&T report in the early 1960's. A high proportion of the All-Source Branch workload in that period stemmed from the heavy emphasis being placed on graphics in the Directorate of Science and Technology. Some reports contained ⎢   ⎢ or more photos, diagrams, charts and maps, greatly enlarging the scope of CD/X activity.

Figure 8. The "Boundary Map" of Vietnam was printed [   ] in 1964-65. (b)(1)
The version above was the first modification made to it following the merger of OCI
Graphics with the All-Source Branch. Prior to September 1965, it suffered from han-
dling problems described under Figure 6. Following the merger, clutter was removed
bit by bit and an almost stylized version was in use in 1970.

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Average Number of Jobs Per Month

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Merger with
OCI Graphics

DDS&T Becomes
Graphics Conscious

1951   1955   1960   1965   1970

Figure 9. Monthly production rate in the All-Source Branch, 1951-1970. Statistics present a generally reliable guide to the burgeoning workload in the Branch but are only part of the story. In the early 1950's almost every item was done from scratch and tailored to the needs of the Weekly. The sharp rise in the early 1960's reflects the growth in the use of graphics in DDS&T reports. Merger with OCI Graphics took place concomitantly with a sharp rise in requests associated with Admiral Raborn's directorship. More emphasis has been placed on quality rather than quantity in recent years.

Archival Record

Figure 10. Maps such as this were routinely prepared to depict military activity in crisis areas, both in Vietnam and elsewhere. They reflect a high degree of cartographic skill, employing methods beyond the ability of other government agencies reporting on the Vietnam war.

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Figure 11. The team effort to pull vast quantities of data together and process it through computers was noteworthy and helped get ADP into use on a routine basis in the Cartography Division.

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
Figure 12. In January 1967, the first of many maps was constructed almost wholly by automatic data processing equipment, presaging a cartographic revolution still in the making. At this writing (March 1972) no cartographic establishment in the world has demonstrated a similar ability.

Tapline Blown Up in Israeli-Occupied Syria

Figure 13. A typical Central Intelligence Bulletin map in 1970. Continuing pressure from top Agency management to "remove the clutter" caused a cartographic style to evolve that centers on conveying a message without sacrifice to cartographic integrity.